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Abstract
This article is a work of comparative political theory and looks at how much of Joseph de Maistre’s 
writings parallel the worldview held by ISIS and Al Qaeda, specifically in regard to the central role of 
absolute authority, the general rejection of modern rationalism, and the openly accepted use of violence 
in order to attain their desired ends.  The last section of this paper will look at similarities between the 
general tone and style of rhetoric utilized by Maistre and ISIS/al Qaeda.  This paper shows that the 
Schmittian language used by Maistre and the aforementioned groups is similar despite their outward 
doctrinal differences.  This paper is an original comparative case study that fits within the emerging 
body of literature that shows that there is a common underlying language that can be ascribed to all 
religious extremist movements, regardless of their actual ideological orientation.
Keywords: Joseph de Maistre, Religious Extremism, ISIS, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, Comparative Political 
Theory
De Maistre İslami Köktenci Olabilir miydi? Joseph de Maistre ve 
Günümüz İslami Köktenci Hareketlerin Söylemleri Arasındaki 
Paralellikler
Öz
Bu makale, Joseph de Maistre’nin yazıları ile IŞİD ve El-Kaide tarafından savunulan dünya görüşü 
arasındaki, özellikle mutlak otoritenin başlıca rolü, modern rasyonalitenin genel olarak reddedilmesi 
ve arzu edilen amaçlara ulaşmada şiddet kullanımının açıkça kabul edilmesi konularında ne kadar 
paralellik bulunduğunu inceleyen bir karşılaştırmalı siyasi kuram çalışmasıdır. Makalenin son 
bölümünde Maistre ve IŞİD/El-Kaide tarafından kullanılan retoriğin genel ton ve stilindeki benzerlikler 
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irdelenecektir. Bu makale, doktrinler arasındaki farklılıklara rağmen Maistre ve yukarıda bahsedilen 
gruplar tarafından kullanılan Schmittçi dilin benzer olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu makale, ideolojik 
yönelimlerinden bağımsız olarak tüm dini aşırılıkçı hareketlerin sahip olduğu ortak bir dilin olduğunu 
gösteren literatür bünyesinde yer alan özgün bir karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışmasıdır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Joseph de Maistre, Dini Aşırılık, IŞİD, El Kaide, Terörizm, Karşılaştırmalı Siyasi 
Kuram
Introduction
Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was a Savoyard Enlightenment Era personality who is still widely 
read today in many graduate level seminars on the French Revolution or Counter-Enlightenment 
Thought.  Maistre’s main point throughout his corpus is clear; absolute authority must be vested 
in one source: the Papacy.  This was actually a moral obligation in Maistre’s eyes.  The political 
function of the Papacy and the topic of absolute authority have been meticulously examined in 
much of the previous research on Maistre. (Mazlish, 1955; Lombard, 1976; LeBrun, 1988; Kochin, 
2002 and Wolin, 2004)  However, scholars have yet to connect Maistre’s ideas to a different set of 
religious values; that of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism.  Indeed, while Maistre was most 
certainly not a Muslim or Muslim sympathizer, this paper argues that the rhetoric and language 
used in his writings is quite similar to the contemporary rhetoric and language used by al Qaeda 
and ISIS.
The Comparative Theory Methodology and its Application
This paper is an exercise in comparative political theory that explores the intersection of politics, 
religion, and ideology.  Andrew March argues that, “Comparison must be, in the first place, 
a method, not just an expedient term vaguely suggesting the focus of one’s research interests 
(e.g., non-Western texts) or substantive concerns and commitments (e.g., critiquing Western 
hegemony)” (2009:537).  According to Fred Dallmayr, 
“Comparative political theory] as a subfield of political theory, it concentrates not so much on 
governmental structures and empirical political processes (the concern of ‘comparative politics’) 
but rather on ideas, perspectives, and theoretical frameworks as they have been formulated 
in the past, and continue to be articulated today, in different parts of the world.” (Dallmayr, 
quoted in March, 2009:553) 
This paper will show similarities between Maistre and al Qaeda and ISIS, specifically in regard to 
the central role of absolute authority, the general rejection of modernity, and most importantly, 
the openly accepted use of violence in order to realize their vision of the world.  This paper will also 
show how the rhetorical style and point-blankness of the writings and audio statements produced 
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by al Qaeda and ISIS both share striking similarities with Maistre’s style.  While al Qaeda and ISIS 
most certainly did not actually read the writings of Joseph de Maistre for inspiration, this paper 
argues that their style fits within a larger, well established tradition of reactionary theo-political 
thought.  This article will strengthen its larger theoretical claims by referencing multiple relevant 
secondary scholarly sources and expert testimony given before governmental panels.  
March argues that the intersection of religious doctrine and political thought is a relevant and 
essential theme within comparative political theory (2009).  Roxanne Euben’s groundbreaking 
work, Enemy in the Mirror (Princeton, 1999), is an example of such scholarship.  Euben convincingly 
argues that scholarship in the West has internalized the belief that antifoundationalist political 
discourses are the only legitimate approaches to political theorizing in a postmodern world. 
However, taking antifoundationalism as an a priori assumption in contemporary theorizing 
often means scholars in the West fail to account for the popularity and significance of ideologies 
such as Islamic fundamentalism that are staunchly grounded in a foundationalist metaphysical 
and epistemological discourse.  In making the assumption that ‘respectable’ political theory 
does not concern itself with questions of the good anymore, Western scholars have often ignored 
contemporary works that are concerned with this question.  
Euben’s work goes on to explore in depth Sayyid Qutb’s belief that modern rationalism is in direct 
opposition to an Islamic conception of the world.  According to Euben, Qutb’s vision “entails a 
rejection of the Western-inspired measurement of civilization in terms of material, scientific, and 
technological progress. The only civilized community, to Qutb, is the moral one; real freedom 
is moral freedom, and true justice is Islamic justice” (1999:58).  She argues that Qutb’s writings 
should not be seen as idiosyncratic; rather Qutb’s ideas can be seen as compatible with other 
strands of Western thought that are critical of modern rationalism and the liberal project in 
general.
“This suggests that political theory can be enriched by hearing Qutb’s voice not only because of 
the ways it speaks to our concerns but also because of the ways it mirrors, challenges, enlarges, 
and transforms them. Indeed, given these arguments, I want to suggest that this cross-cultural 
comparison may ultimately undermine the very opposition between “Islam” and “the West.” 
(Euben, 1999:12)
One of the broader points that this paper makes is that the ideas, values, and rhetorical strategy 
of groups like al Qaeda and ISIS are hardly novel.  Such ideas can be traced back to a discourse 
far less alien to a Western audience - just as Qutb’s ideas can be seen as interwoven within larger 
fabric of ideas produced by Western thinkers who are critical of modern rationalism or liberalism. 
Comparative political theory must avoid judging non-Western ideas within a Western analytic 
framework.  Even some of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century like Max Weber were guilty of 
this (Kaminski, 2016).  One of the important things about comparative political theory for March 
was “that it does not seek to prejudge non-Western thought or impose Western judgments” (March, 
2009:551).  March goes on to argue that comparative political theory has an interest in evaluating 
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and comparing thinkers whose ideas transcend their own cultural, religious, and/or civilizational 
identity.  This echoes the sentiment of Megan Thomas who argues that comparative political 
theory “has often aimed to correct what it sees as European and North American chauvinism, by 
highlighting commonalities between that “Western” world and those outside of it” (2010:665). 
Thomas quotes Euben who argues that comparative political theory ought to highlight the 
similar dilemmas and questions shared by different cultural traditions.  In Euben’s words, “This, 
in turn, establishes the possibility of and conditions for conversations across cultures” (Euben, 
quoted in Thomas, 2010:10).  The long term goal of comparative political theory is the continual 
democratization of the political theory discourse, freeing it from Eurocentric scholarship that 
still, inadvertently or perhaps even purposefully, mitigates the unique contribution of non-
Western thought.  
Comparative political theory ought not to prejudge non-Western cultures and ideas, however this 
does not mean comparative political theorists should avoid making normative claims altogether. 
Dallmayr believes that there is room for both normative and non-normative comparative political 
theory and that one of the most important things to consider “is whether critique proceeds 
from a presumed self-righteousness or hegemonic arrogance, or else from a shared engagement 
and a willingness to engage in a mutually transforming learning process” (2004:254).  Good 
comparative political theorizing will point out inconsistencies and deviations from the generally 
accepts norms and values within a larger discourse.  
I believe that contemporary comparative political theorists ought not to attack the ideas of groups 
like ISIS and al Qaeda because they are in violation of Western notions of justice, democracy, and 
gender rights - this should be left to politicians, journalists, and activists. Instead, contemporary 
comparative political theorists ought to criticize the ideas of groups like ISIS and al Qaeda because 
they are inconsistent with Islam’s more generally accepted discursive framework. This is a more 
philosophically worthwhile enterprise and avoids the immediate suspicion of Orientalism or 
hegemonic arrogance that comes with criticizing a discourse from an analytic framework outside 
that discourse being criticized.  Throughout this article, it will be shown that the ideas held by 
al Qaeda and ISIS are not only are inconsistent within Islam, but that in reality, their ideas share 
more in common with the writings of Joseph de Maistrethan anything else.
Finally, comparative political theory must justify why comparing thinkers operating within 
different intellectual traditions is important and relevant.  “Exploring the normative implications 
for us of principled value-conflict is an appropriate task of engaged political theory and could 
be made the centerpiece of the comparative political theory project. Thus, comparative political 
theory may be conceived of as “justificatory” comparative political theory” (March, 2009:560). 
In an email exchange with Professor March asking for further clarification on this point he 
explained that there should be some type of general claim or recommendation pushed forward 
when doing comparative political theory - in his view, comparing different writers just for the 
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sake of ‘comparison’ is not enough.1 Comparing the writings of Joseph de Maistre and groups like 
al Qaeda and ISIS serve a very practical, real world function; such scholarship can help scholars 
and policy makers understand attitudes held by individuals or groups situated within other 
reactionary discourses.  
Future research should continue to engage with writers of the past and make efforts to connect 
these thinkers’ worldviews and statements with more recent forms of extremism.  Such research 
will help create a scholarly database that can be readily accessed to analyze and understand future 
extremist movements that may not exist today but might in the near future. The emergence of an 
extremist movement is difficult forecast.  Such research can also provide ideas for ways political 
actors can modify their own behaviors and policies that often illicit fundamentalist backlash.
Framing Contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism
Islamic Fundamentalism does not have a universally accepted definition.  Roxanne Euben argues 
that fundamentalism in general, “refers to contemporary religio-political movements that attempt 
to return to the scriptural foundations of the community, excavating and reinterpreting these 
foundations for application to the contemporary social and political world” (Euben, 1999:17).  It is 
best understood as a reaction to dilemmas facing the modern world.  At the core of fundamentalist 
discourses is a belief in directly engaging with the outside world; it should not be understood as 
a retreat into inward-looking mysticism.  Ira Lapidus argues that fundamentalism is not just 
a reaction against modernity; rather it should be understood as an alternative expression of it 
(1997).  Oliver Roy echoes this sentiment in arguing that “[r]ather than a reaction against the 
modernization of Muslim societies, Islamism is a product of it” (2007:50).  According to Euben, 
“It is thus perhaps more accurate to say that fundamentalism is profoundly critical of as well 
as constituted by assumptions regarding the requirements of modernity and modern politics” 
(1999:18).  Nikolas Kompridis describes one of the essential elements of the modern worldview 
as being open “to the novelty of the future [that] keeps perpetually open the possibility of a 
future different from the past, a possibility that contains the promise of a break with the past, and 
the promise of a new beginning” (2006:38).  This is the notion of modernity al Qaeda and ISIS 
are at odds with - both groups are not looking for a future different from the past; both groups 
seek a return to it.  Rather than the promise of a new beginning, both seek to rekindle a past that 
ended with the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924.  It is important to remember that al Qaeda and 
ISIS are opposed to the philosophical notion of modernity; this should not be misunderstood as 
1 In an e-mail correspondence with Prof. March, I asked what he meant by, ‘examining thoroughly what first-order 
implication the normative dispute has.’ He responded, “I definitely meant something like “to connect the normative 
dispute to something in a more real world, practical sense.” For example, there are normative disputes about the 
scope of rights (like free speech or bodily autonomy) that are approached differently from different traditions but 
are a common object of concern or dispute. One role for comparative political theory is to explore what it would 
mean to justify one resolution or another from within alternative traditions.”  (March 2015, personal correspondence) 
I sincerely appreciate his kindness in taking the time meticulously answer my question.
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implying fundamentalist groups are opposed to all things modern. Both terrorist groups have 
embraced modern weaponry and state-of-the-art communications technology as a fundamental 
part of their long-term strategies.     
The rise in Islamic fundamentalism is also linked to economic and political failures in the Muslim 
world.  Rapid urban migration along with economic poverty in rural areas and high levels economic 
inequality have all been key contributing factors to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.  Rather 
than just dismissing Islamic fundamentalism as irrational, Euben references Amartya Sen who 
makes the point that if one is acting in their own self interests, whatever they may be - economic, 
emotional, or spiritual - then they can be said to acting rationally.  Euben believes that “perhaps 
most peculiar about the rational actor model is the insistence that all behavior can be explained 
simply by recasting each action as an instance of rational behavior “properly understood,” that 
is, intelligible to market logic” (1999:12). The rational actor model in the Western context has 
mistakenly been universalized to incorporate all global actors.  Euben’s point is that rationality 
can only be understood in terms of the local discourse it is situated within.  A seriously devout 
Muslim who prioritizes spiritual obligations over worldly ends would view someone in the West 
maximizing their economic well being at the expense of their spiritual well being as irrational. 
Economic rationality as understood in the West cannot simply be the ubiquitous understanding 
rationality in general.
All forms of fundamentalism have a praxeological dimension.  This hearkens back to the earlier 
point that such movements should not be understood a retreat into mysticism.  One essential 
element of Islamic fundamentalism is a belief in the necessity of making Islam politically relevant 
again.  “The philosophical roots of Islamic fundamentalism are largely the result of a conscious 
attempt to revive and restate the theoretical relevance of Islam in the modern world” (1998:38).  As 
a political movement, Islamic fundamentalism is on the right of the political spectrum within the 
larger umbrella of political Islam.  However, this is not always the case for other Islamist political 
movements (March, 2015). Contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movements seek to restore 
lost moral purity.  These movements often utilize propaganda about the threats of hedonism and 
seek to integrate social classes into a more universal group that transcends class.  Rarely does 
one hear serious critiques from groups like al Qaeda or ISIS about economic systems or racial 
discrimination.  These problems are seen as by-products of Western imperialism and decadence. 
Such ‘Western problems’ would not exist in their ideal vision of society.  Populist appeals to a 
united ummah, or community of believers, has been a central theme of al Qaeda and ISIS.  
Al Qaeda and ISIS fundamentalism can be further understood as being situated at a historical/
geo-political level and at a doctrinal level.  These two differing explanatory levels are not mutually 
exclusive, and in many cases overlap. At the historical/geo-political level, contemporary Islamic 
fundamentalism can be best described as a reaction by those Muslims who view the nation state 
model as a by-product of Western imperialism that sought to divide and conquer Muslim lands. 
Abrogating the 1916 Franco-British crafted, Sykes-Picot Agreement that carved the Arab world 
into the general picture one sees on the map today has been repeatedly referenced by al Qaeda 
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and ISIS as a primary goal.  According to a statement by Osama Bin Laden that was released 
on 13 February 2003, “We still suffer from the injuries inflicted by the Crusaders’ wars on the 
Islamic world in the last century and by the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France 
which divided the Muslim world into fragments” (Bin Laden, quoted in Bergen, 2006:373). 
ISIS has also included references to the Sykes-Picot in their own recent propaganda.  On 29 
June 2014, ISIS published videos titled “Breaking the Borders” and “The End of Sykes-Picot” 
that showed the physical destruction of a land barrier demarcating the Syria-Iraq border (Lister, 
2015).  The map drawn by the European powers permanently fragmented and weakened the 
Muslim world allowing for decades of economic and cultural exploitation that continues to this 
day. The abrogation of the Sykes-Picot agreement and restoration of the Caliphate have been 
central themes in contemporary Fundamentalist intellectual circles despite the major obstacles 
to achieving these goals.  
The second level at which al Qaeda and ISIS fundamentalism can be understood is at a doctrinal 
level.  Both represent a politicized version of Salafism.  This is a deviation from most other 
movements within the Salafist discourse that tend to be apolitical.  For example, the version 
of Salafism that is based on the writings of controversial Saudi Imam, Rabee Al-Madkhali, 
often referred to as Madkhalism, is opposed to political engagement and believes that the Saudi 
Monarchy is divinely ordained and opposition to it is tantamount to heresy.  Political or apolitical: 
Salafism is associated with literalist, strict, and puritanical approaches to Islam within the Sunni 
discourse.  
“The Salafi movement is united by a commitment to a particular version of the Muslim 
creed, an unyielding focus on purifying Muslim belief and practice from any imaginable 
form of idolatry (shirk), and an obsession with mastering the words and deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammad for the purposes of both knowledge and emulation in practice” (Haykel 2009).2 
(March, 2015:2014)  
The Salafist method is rooted in an essentialist worldview in which individuals and society at 
large are imbued with certain innate qualities and attributes that transcend space and time.  As 
a result of the unchanging nature of man, the values and laws expressed in the 7th century are 
considered not only valid today, but the only legitimate set of laws than should govern society 
at any time and place.  This is a deviation from the writings of previous Islamic scholars such as 
the 19th century Egyptian reformer, Mohammad Abduh, and his teacher, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
who both believed that Islam must recognize that people change with time, and that laws and 
political processes must accommodate for these changes.  
Shari ‘a is interpreted in a very conservative and literalist way by fundamentalist groups such 
as al Qaeda and ISIS that are far stricter than the way they were interpreted in the Middle Ages. 
Joseph Lowry notes that “[t]he doctrines formulated by Muslims jurists in the Middle Ages made 
it very difficult to convict, either because they defined the crimes extremely narrowly or because 
2 The other work mentioned in this reference is, B. Haykel, “On the nature of Salafi thought and action,” in R. Meijer 
(ed.), Global Salafism:  Islam’s New Religious Movement, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009), 33-35.
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the requirement for evidence was extremely high” (Lowry, quoted in Atkinson and Donaghy, 
2015).  While many of the laws and penalties utilized by ISIS for certain crimes are similar to the 
penalties utilized in Saudi Arabia today, the implementation of these penalties is far different. 
Saudi Arabia’s approach “to implementing these punishments is very different - Saudi Arabia 
rarely, if ever, carries out executions for blasphemy or adultery” (Lowry, quoted in Atkinson and 
Donaghy, 2015).  This strict interpretation of scripture, laws, and punishments all differentiate 
mainstream Islamic political and social movements from fundamentalist movements.
Finally, I need to point out that I am not trying to argue that al Qaeda and ISIS are one in the same; 
the two movements have some critical fundamental differences.  ISIS has declared a Caliphate 
whereas Al Qaeda has not, nor appears to be doing so anytime in the foreseeable future.  Also, 
Al Qaeda generally posits the United States and the West as its primary enemy, whereas until 
very recently ISIS has generally focused its attention on local enemies.  ISIS has most specifically 
targeted Shi’a and other Arab groups that deviate from its norms.  In testimony presented before 
the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Committee on Homeland 
Security, Daniel Byman commented, 
“The Islamic State does not follow Al Qaeda’s “far enemy” strategy, preferring instead the “near 
enemy” strategy, albeit on a regional level. As such, the primary target of the Islamic State has 
not been the United States, but rather “apostate” regimes in the Arab world-namely, the Asad 
regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq.” (Byman, 2015:4)
The same testimony goes on to argue that ISIS has more of an interest territorial control, whereas 
al Qaeda remains more interested in large scale, dramatic attacks against strategic or symbolic 
targets. Things have changed since Byman’s testimony.  ISIS has moved more towards the al Qaeda 
model of large scale, dramatic attacks in recent months as illustrated by the terrorist attacks in 
France, Turkey, and Belgium. My point is that despite some major tactical differences, al Qaeda 
and ISIS both fit within the rubric of transnational Islamist movements that are firmly entrenched 
within an anti-rationalist discourse just as Euben argues Qutb’s writings were.  Both movements 
are in opposition to the modern historical outlook as mentioned by Kompridis, and in this regard 
share many similarities with Joseph de Maistre as this paper will now go on to argue.
Reactions to Modernity
The French Revolution that Joseph de Maistre so detested represented a radical shift in political 
alliances and power.  Alberto Spektorowski argued that the thought of Joseph de Maistre “was 
thus paradigmatic of a Catholic concept of political power that reflected a particular view of 
the relationship between the social and the political” (2008:456).  Maistre was a complicated 
figure.  Owen Bradley argued that Maistre’s traditionalism was surprisingly “forward-looking, 
something more than the threadbare ideology of an impotent aristocracy” (Bradley, 2001:xiii). 
Maistre himself was a far more cosmopolitan figure than much of his writings suggest.  He was 
by all accounts an urbane and refined man who regularly frequented the elegant salons of Saint 
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Petersburg.  His personal manners stood in staunch opposition to his vehement diatribes against 
Protestantism and the French Revolution. Cara Camcastle argued that in spite of his attachment 
to monarchy and his deep seeded skepticism towards written constitutions, Maistre himself 
opposed despotism and was a great admirer of the English unwritten constitution (2005). Many 
people to this day still debate whether Maistre was a simple provocateur (or what is commonly 
referred to today as ‘a troll’), whether his soul belonged to the Inquisition, or whether he was 
little more than an aesthete lost in Catholicism. Despite the more recently published moderate 
re-evaluations of Maistre offered by Bradley and Camcastle, the deeply reactionary elements 
scattered throughout his writings cannot be dismissed.  
The folly of the Reformation for Maistre was that it gave people access to the scriptures, thus 
mitigating the overall monopoly of doctrinal interpretive authority held by Church for so many 
centuries. “According to Maistre, the Reformation had propagated the idea that Scripture was 
common property and should be distributed without mediation to all and sundry. But if authority 
was effectively dispersed in this manner, what became of doctrinal truth?” (Thurston, 2010:81). 
In his classic polemical style of writing, Maistre writes early in the first chapter of, The Pope; 
Considered in his Relations with the Church (Howard Fertig Publishers, 1975), “So all Catholic 
writers, worthy of the name, agree unanimously that the rule of the church is monarchical, but 
sufficiently tempered with aristocracy, to be the best and most perfect of governments” (1975:2). 
The role of the aristocracy was to make sure the Pope’s power was ‘sufficiently tempered,’ but 
it is quite apparent that Maistre does not really take this point seriously.  He does not give any 
explanation about this would actually be done.  In actuality, Maistre argues that councils within 
the church have no authority to go against the will of the Pope.  
“Wherever there is a Sovereign, and in the Catholic economy his existence in undeniable, 
there can be no legitimate national assemblies without him.  No sooner is his veto pronounced, 
than the assembly is dissolved, or its co-legislative power is suspended; if it resists, there is 
revolution.” (Maistre, 1975:11)  
The events of 1789 were a direct by-product of the modernity that Maistre openly opposed. The 
writings of the philosophes did not just penetrate the minds of the general public. The ideas of the 
philosophes even were incorporated into the ongoing struggles within the church. According to 
George Rudé, 
“The ideas of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau and many others were widely disseminated 
and were absorbed by an eager reading public, both aristocratic and plebian.  It had become 
fashionable even among the clergy to be skeptical and ‘irreligious’ and the writings of Voltaire 
had combined with the struggles within the Church itself (above all, the resentment of the 
parish clergy over the wealth and increasing authority of the Bishops) to expose the church to 
indifference, contempt or hostility.” (1988:7)  
For Maistre, the French Revolution was literally the physical manifestation of the world’s evil 
and corruption all in one place at one time.  Regular, God-fearing Christians were led astray 
by the sophists. “In his [Maistre’s] eyes the revolution signified providential retribution for 
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France’s sacrilegious flirtation with “enlightened” ideas: her wanton indulgence in atheism and 
materialism, culminating in the sin of regicide” (Wolin, 2004:285).  The anti-philosophes regularly 
made indictments against what the end results would be if the philosophes ideas became widely 
adopted. According to Carolina Armenteros, in Maistre’s eyes, “the Revolution was ‘Satanic’ 
because it was the consummation of history, of the sins and miseries of which Bayle insisted the 
human narrative was composed” (Armenteros in Lebrun and Armenteros, 2010:100-01).  On the 
disastrous results of the French Revolution, Maistre comments,
“The Revolution has plundered, exiled, massacred the priesthood; it has practiced [sp] every 
species of cruelty against the natural defenders of the maxims which it held in abhorrence. 
The ancient warriors of the sacred camp have departed to their rest; young recruits are indeed 
coming forward to fill their places, but they are still necessarily few in number, the enemy 
having, by anticipation, cut off their supplies with the most fatal ability.” (1975:XX)
If one substituted the word ‘priesthood’ with ‘ulema,’ and ‘ancient warriors’ with ‘jihadi martyrs’ 
this would sound similar to something plagiarized from some recent statement issued by ISIS or 
Al Qaeda.  In a statement found by the Manchester, UK Police in 2000 in an Al Qaeda recruitment 
manual, Al Qaeda’s sentiment towards modernity is quite clear.  
“Colonialism and its followers, the apostate rulers, then start to openly erect crusader centers, 
societies, and organizations like Masonic Lodges, Lions and Rotary clubs, and foreign schools. 
They aimed at producing a wasted generation that pursued everything that is western and 
produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, 
and information specialists.” (“The Al Qaeda Manual”, 7)
Al Qaeda sees things like Masonic Lodges and similar civic clubs as corrupting.  Even the most 
banal occupations today such as businessmen and information specialists are corrupted.  These 
entities have all been permanently tainted by not only colonialism, but by modernity in general. 
Such rigidity is largely absent from earlier Islamic worldviews.  As a matter of historical fact, 
Mohammed Abduh was a freemason himself.  Other Muslim freemasons along with Abduh 
included Prince Tawfiq, the Khedive’s son and heir and other well known figures within the 
Muslim political elite of the time such as Muhammad Sharif Pasha who had been a minister, 
Sulayman Abaza Pasha and Saad Zaghlul.  
ISIS also criticizes modernity. “The modern day slavery of employment, work hours, wages, etc. 
is one that leaves the Muslim in a constant feeling of subjugation to a kāfir master.  He does not 
live [with] the might and honor that every Muslim should live and experience” (Dabiq, Issue 
3:29). Maistre, Al Qaeda, and ISIS all see modernity as destroying young minds and creating an 
enthralled and decadent, wasted generation that spends its time in pursuit of worldly pleasures.    
Like Maistre, Al Qaeda and ISIS also glorify the role of holy warriors. All 3 discourses recognize 
them as the cornerstone and defenders of their respective societal orders.  Maistre explicitly saw 
war as possessing a cleansing and purifying function. 
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“War is therefore divine in itself, since it is a law of the world.  […] War is divine in the 
mysterious glory that surrounds it and in the no less inexplicable attraction that draws us to it. 
[…] War is divine by the manner in which it breaks out.” (1993:218) 
According to a statement issued by al Qaeda’s current leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The best 
people, then, are those who are prepared for jihad in the path of Allah Most High, requesting 
martyrdom at any time or place.  Whenever he hears the call to jihad he flies to it until Allah’s 
authority is established” (al-Zawahiri, quoted in Ibrahim (ed.), 2007:145-46). Maistre’s, ‘ancient 
warriors of the sacred camp,’ and Zawahiri’s warrior who, ‘hears the call to jihad’ and ‘flies to it 
until Allah’s authority is established,’ are one in the same - these warriors are young, courageous, 
and most importantly, unquestioning fighters who place their theological missions ahead of all 
other worldly things.  
According to the Al Qaeda Manual confiscated in the UK shortly after 9/11, “[t]he young came 
to prepare themselves for Jihad [holy war], commanded by the majestic Allah’s order in the holy 
Koran” (8-9). For Al Qaeda, the youth who fight in these holy battles that survive will ultimately 
become the moral bedrock and authority of their respective society; those who die will be 
remembered as martyrs and will become legends.  
ISIS has also glorified the role of young holy warriors in their own writings and statements.  One 
particular call for immigration to ISIS controlled territory that appeared in Dabiq, the new online 
magazine of ISIS, stated, “Jihād not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, it also 
grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual.  This life of Jihād is not possible until you pack 
and move to the khilāfah” (Dabiq, Issue 3:29).  Maistre, al Qaeda, and ISIS see the youth as being 
divinely ordained to bring forth the revolution.  
“The Infidel”
Maistre invokes a term in his writings over 200 years ago that today conjure up images of 
contemporary radical Islam rather than Roman Catholicism: the infidel.  According to Maistre, 
“The infidel, on the other hand, laughs at all dissenters, makes use of them all, quite sure that 
all, more or less, and each one of them is in his way, will forward his great work, the destruction 
of Christianity” (1975:34). Maistre’s sentiment towards religious toleration and pluralism were 
in line with the general sentiment on the topic held by other reactionary thinkers of the era. 
On the view of religious toleration and pluralism held by reactionary thinkers of Maistre’s time, 
McMahon writes, 
“On the one hand, anti-philosophes charged that the plea for tolerance merely confirmed their 
enemies’ indifference to religious truth, laying bare a deeper, more sinister design. By treating all 
faiths equally, the philosophes sought to water down the one true faith in a deluge of relativism, 
drowning Catholicism in an endless sea of competing beliefs.” (2001:45) 
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Maistre did not view the infidel as one who merely rejected or disbelieved in the teachings of 
the church; rather he saw the infidel as an individual who was constantly engaged in a plot to 
destroy the Christian, specifically Roman Catholic, way of life. For Maistre, the infidel was a 
transgenerational problem.  Maistre, like Nietzsche, believed that the moral and emotional traits 
of the parent passed down to their offspring.  Ferdinand Caussy writes that in Nietzsche’s view, 
“man benefits from all the good things that have been handed down by ancestors and divinities; he 
thus becomes accountable to them, he inherits a debt that he must pay by offerings and sacrifices” 
(Caussy, 2009:247).  For Maistre and Nietzsche, put simply; moral parents make moral children 
- immoral parents make immoral children. Maistre argues “that all beings with the faculty of 
reproduction will produce beings similar to themselves. The rule suffers no exception; it is written 
everywhere in the universe” (1993:34). For Maistre, a generation of infidels not only sought to 
destroy Christianity in their own generation, but that such infidels will also eventually sow the 
seeds of destruction through their offspring to destroy future generations as well.
This hostile attitude towards the infidel deeply resonates with Islamic fundamentalist attitudes 
towards non-Muslims. In the words of Al Qaeda on infidels, 
“There are only three choice in Islam: either willing submission; or payment of the jizya, thereby 
physical, thought not spiritual, submission to the authority of Islam; or the sword—for it is not 
right to let him [an infidel] live.  The matter is summed up for every person alive: either submit, 
or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or die.” (Al Qaeda, quoted in Ibrahim (ed.), 2007:19-20) 
The Fundamentalist attitude towards non-Muslims is primarily based on a misunderstood verse 
from the Qur’an that warns Muslims of befriending non-Muslims. “O ye who believe! Choose not 
for friends such of those who received the Scripture before you, and of the disbelievers, as make a 
jest and sport of your religion. But keep your duty to Allah if ye are true believers” (Qur’an 5:57). 
According to the respected 21st century Indian Islamic scholar, Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, 
this verse warns Muslims to be cautious around non-Muslims, but in no way calls for rudeness or 
hostility and most certainly does not call for violence. 
“Aulia is the plural of wali. Wali means a friend, some one [sp] close, as well as a helper. What 
it means is that Muslims are expected not to make Jews, Christians, and all other disbelievers 
(kuffar) their protecting friends, as has been clarified in [S]urah Nisaa. However, to deal 
with them with justice, politeness, generosity, and decency is quite another matter.” (Usmani, 
1959:154) 
Maistre unwittingly echoes in a similar way how al Qaeda and ISIS interpret this Qur’anic 
reference in his own warning about infidels. Very similar phrases are utilized by Maistre on the 
disbeliever that ‘laughs at all dissenters,’ and the Qur’anic injunction warning of the disbeliever 
who, ‘make a jest and sport of your religion.’
Like Maistre, Al Qaeda and ISIS envision a world ruled under the absolute authority of a specific 
religious source - for Maistre it was the Catholic Church; for al Qaeda and ISIS it is a very strict version 
of Wahhabism.  According to a statement made by Osama bin Laden in 2001 shortly after 9/11;
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“Our concern is that our ummah unites either under the Words of the Book of God or His 
Prophet, and that this nations [sp] should establish the righteous caliphate of our ummah, 
which has been prophesised by our Prophet in his authentic hadith: that the righteous caliph 
will return with the permission of God.” (Bin Laden, quoted in Lawrence (ed.), 2005:121) 
Those who choose to live outside the framework of that source have limited options.  To not live 
by the rules of Islam as interpreted by al Qaeda, or at the least physically submit to these rules, 
warrants death.  
While Al Qaeda envisions a world that is ultimately ruled under the authority of one source, ISIS 
actually believes that it is that source. On 1 July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi issued an audio 
statement declaring the creation of the Caliphate and the first video emerged of him as the Caliph 
four days later. “O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head 
high, for today - by Allah’s grace - you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, 
might, rights, and leadership” (Dabiq, Issue 1:4) Maistre, like Al Qaeda and ISIS, view those 
who live outside the fold of their religious purview as dangerous and potentially treacherous. 
According to the opening statement in the 1st issue of Dabiq, “Anyone who dares to offend him 
will be disciplined, and any hand that reaches out to harm him will be cut off ” (8).  
Al Qaeda and ISIS also share Maistre’s belief that the values and morals of parents get passed 
down to their children, however they are more optimistic about the possibility of changing these 
values via propaganda and indoctrination.  These groups have made serious efforts at converting 
and ultimately recruiting impressionable non-Muslim teenagers and young adults into their fold. 
Both have created highly professional looking magazines to promote their agendas. Al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula launched Inspire in 2010 and ISIS launched Dabiq in 2014. Inspire focuses 
on encouraging its readers to carry out lone-wolf attacks on the West, while Dabiq is more 
concerned with establishing the religious legitimacy of ISIL and its self-proclaimed Caliphate, 
and encouraging Muslims to emigrate there (Gambhir, 2014).  It would be interesting to consider 
if Maistre would have been more successful if he could have harnessed the power of the internet 
and social media that is available for extremists of all types today.
The Vanguard and the Return to Past Glory and Greatness
Maistre hoped that his writings would be a sort of ‘message in a bottle’ for future generations 
that may have the capacity to actually carry out the counter revolution that he envisioned. 
According to Michael Kochin, “Maistre’s defence [sp] of divine providence was not intended for 
a remnant of believers in an atheistic world, but for a counterrevolutionary élite that would save 
the states of Europe, from Russia to Ireland, for Catholic Christianity” (2002:39).  This attitude 
of defending divine providence with the hope that eventually counter revolutionary elites would 
save Christianity is precisely the attitude ISIS has adopted, except in the ISIS case, the purpose is 
to save Islam.  ISIS literally has been calling for ‘the elites’ in its most concrete sense throughout 
the world to join its ranks.  Another recruitment call that appeared in Daqib stated, 
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“Therefore, every Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past under the pretense of 
studying Shari’ah, medicine, or engineering, etc., claiming he would contribute to Islam later 
with his expertise, should now make his number one priority to repent and answer the call to 
hijrah, especially after the establishment of the Khilafah [caliphate]. This Khilafah is more in 
need than ever before for experts, professionals, and specialists, who can help contribute in 
strengthening its structure and tending to the needs of their Muslim brothers.” (Issue 3:26) 
The uncritical glorification of the past, or a romantic ‘return to past glories,’ is a common element 
within reactionary thought. (Bronner, 1999)  The Nazi’s sought to return to an era of Teutonic 
Knights while the Italian Fascist movement under Mussolini sought a return to its glory days of 
the Roman Empire under the Caesars.  Within the language of al Qaeda and ISIS is a desire for 
a return to the age of the Prophet Mohammed.  Like al Qaeda and ISIS, Maistre also sought to 
return to a previous epoch - one of purity and piety, free from the contemporary worldly evils 
that had all but consumed humanity by the 18th century in his mind. It is not surprising then that 
Maistre looks back to the glory days when the Catholic Church’s authority in France was absolute 
and unquestioned only a few generations earlier: the Crusades.  
In Maistre’s worldview, the Middle Ages in Europe were an era in which Christian souls were 
unified against the common threats of foreign religious influences.  For Maistre, the paragon of 
piety was embodied in the ‘noble mission’ of the crusaders a few centuries earlier. “When in the 
Middle Ages, we repaired to Asia, and endeavored, sword in hand, to break on its own territory, 
that formidable crescent which threatened all the liberties of Europe, the French were likewise 
at the head of this immortal enterprise” (Maistre, 1975, xxviii).  Credit for such ‘repairs’ goes to 
the Papacy. “As to wars that were just, holy even, and necessary, as were the crusades, if the Popes 
provoked them, and sustained them with all their might, then they did well, and we owe them our 
unfailing gratitude” (Maistre, 1975:214).  If the Papacy actually did provoke the Crusades, which 
Maistre clearly knows they did despite the rhetorical question as to whether they actually did or 
not, then the Papacy ought to be venerated for being the impetus behind such a ‘just, holy even, 
and necessary’ war.  Political and religious violence is a paragon for Maistre, and it is the head of 
the Catholic Church that most effectively organizes and inspires such immortal enterprises.  
Within the Maistrean and al Qaeda/ISIS worldview, only an elite vanguard of martyrs who are 
willing to unquestioningly go into battle and die under the banner of their faiths can ever hope 
to recreate a ‘pristine and authentic’ form of that faith that has long since disappeared. While ISIS 
argues that it is the new Islamic State that will be the vanguard state in which a larger jihad against 
secularism and atheism will be based, Joseph de Maistre explicitly argued that France was the 
heart and soul of the Crusades, and that it was the French Catholics who actually led the Crusades 
against the Muslims and other religions deemed false.  Maistre commented that “[t]he French 
scepter was both illustrious at Jerusalem and Constantinople.  What great things was there not 
reason to expect of it?” (1975:xxviii)  Maistre goes on to state, 
“The French name made so great an impression in the east, that it there has remained 
synonymous, as it were, with that of Europe; and the greatest poet in Italy writing in the 
sixteenth century hesitates not to employ the same expression.” (1975:xxviii)  
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Once again we see a nationalistic chauvinism in Maistre’s writings; yes, the Crusaders in general 
were heroic, but specifically it was the French Crusaders and French clerical authorities who were 
the true heroes throughout the various Crusades. The key point here is that both ISIS and Maistre 
employ a specific ‘chosen nation’ as the ultimate bringer of truth, similar to how Hegel posits 
certain nation-states as the vehicle in which geist travels; a state that stands head and shoulders 
above others terms of cultural and historical importance (Hegel, 1981).  
Reductionism and the Schmittian Rhetoric of ‘Us-versus-Them’
The writing style of Joseph de Maistre has been of interest to literary critics since the 19th century. 
Alphonse de Lamartine, on Maistre’s writing style comments, 
“That brief, nervous, lucid style, stripped of phrases, robust of limb, did not at all recall the 
softness of the eighteenth century, nor the declamations of the latest French books: it was born 
and steeped in the breath of the Alps; it was virgin, it was young, it was harsh and savage; it 
had no human respect, it felt its solitude; it improvised depth and form all at once… That man 
was new among the enfants du siècle.” (Lebrun in Lebrun and Armenteros (eds.), 2010:4)
Even though Lamartine shared some of Maistre’s views, he still saw Maistre as a man who was 
not a great thinker.  
“This was a crude soul, but a great soul; an uncivilized intelligence, but a vast intelligence; a rude 
style, but a strong style. Thus delivered to himself, all his philosophy was only the theory of his 
religious instincts. [...] the writer in him was quite superior to the thinker, but the man was very 
superior to the thinker and to the writer.” (Lebrun in Lebrun and Armenteros (eds.), 2010:6) 
Another, better known literary figures assessment of Maistre is similar - Charles Augustin Sainte-
Beuve in regards to Maistre and his rhetorical style commented, 
“One of his favourite expressions, and one which he often used was point-blank. This was the 
secret of his tactics, this was his gesture; this was the way he acted; he advanced alone against 
a whole enemy army, mouthing his challenge, and shooting the leader point-blank. He attacks 
in glory, to triumph, and earns an excess of reprisals. In Rome’s spiritual distress, this was 
the Christian Scaevola, and the three hundred others did not follow.” (Lebrun in Lebrun and 
Armenteros (ed.), 2010:8)
Both Lamartine and Sainte-Beuve recognized the power of Maistre’s ‘strong style’ and ‘point-
blank’ words, and the way he chose to incorporate them in his writings.  Even Charles Baudelaire 
showed deep admiration for Maistre’s writing abilities.  Baudelaire responding to a criticism of 
Maistre made by his own contemporary, Alphonse Toussenel, stated, “And a man like you!  One 
who will go by the way, as a simple writer of the century, insults de Maistre, the great genius of 
our time - a luminary!”3 (Baudelaire, 1966:337).  Baudelaire’s infatuation with Maistre’s style was 
during his own transition towards prose poetry (Mills, 2003). 
3 I translated this quote into English.  The original quote was, “Et un homme comme vous! lâcher en passant, comme un 
simple rédacteur du siècle, des injures à de Maistre, le grand génie de notre temps, - un voyant!”         
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Maistre’s philosophical views generally offered an oversimplified and reductionist analysis of the 
world.   In The St. Petersburg Dialogues, the Count, the character who represents Maistre’s views, 
condescendingly categorizes the entire philosophical enterprise as being a feeble legislator. “And 
although philosophy is a feeble legislator whose best laws may even be ridiculed because it lacks 
the power to make itself obeyed, nevertheless we must be fair and give it credit for the truth that 
it has published” (Maistre, 1993:24).  The Count goes on to comment that unlike philosophy 
however, Christianity avoided the trappings of being a feeble legislator.
“But the Christian law, which is nothing but the revealed will of him who knows everything and can 
do everything, does not limit itself to vain counsels.  It has made of abstinence, of habitual victory 
over our desires, a capital precept that must regulate man’s entire life.” (Maistre, 1993:24)
The ideas Christian law derives directly from the revealed will of God and that Christian law is 
not limited to vain counsels are both categorically false.  These beliefs show either a serious lack of 
understanding of the basic historical development of the Catholic Church and Canon law, or are 
actually part of Maistre’s the rhetorical strategy of to provide a cursory explanation of Christian 
Law that would appeal to a semi-literate audience whom lacked the intellectual tools and material 
resources to counter his claims.   
Canonical legal theory is situated within an Aristotlean-Thomistic legal philosophy that is largely 
based in reason.  §1976 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church quotes St. Thomas Aquinas 
as stating, “Law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by the one who is 
in charge of the community.” (Part 3, Section 1, Chapter 3)  §1986 directly mentions the role 
of evangelical councils that Maistre claims do not exist in his Church.  “Besides its precepts the 
New Law includes the evangelical counsels. “The Church’s holiness is fostered in a special way by 
the manifold counsels which the Lord proposes to his disciples in the Gospel.” (Part 3, Section 1, 
Chapter 3)  These protocols also it make clear that Jesus was the one who created the law and then 
transmitted it to his disciples who then wrote what he said in the various Gospels.  §1977 states, 
“Christ is the end of the law (cf ⇒ Rom 10:4); only he teaches and bestows the justice of God.” (Part 3, 
Section 1, Chapter 3)  This is hardly the same as a jurisprudential theory whose authority is solely 
based on ‘the revealed will of him who knows everything and can do everything.’  The Gospels are 
understood in Christianity to be inspired by God, but not the actual words written by God in the 
sense of the 10 Commandments described in the Book of Exodus which were engraved by God 
on stone tablets that were then given to Moses on Mount Sinai.
Maistre in his next sentence does seem to recognize that councils within the Church actually do 
exist, seemingly contradicting his previous statement.  
“Moreover, it [Christian law] has made the more or less severe, more or less frequent, privation 
of the permitted pleasures of the table a fundamental law that can be modified according to the 
circumstances, but that always remains invariable in its essence.” (Maistre, 1993:24)  
It is deeply problematic to argue that Christian Law is nothing but the revealed law of God, but 
at the same time, its fundamental laws can be modified according to circumstances.  Maistre 
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does not go on to give any example of how a fundamental law can be modified while entire legal 
system remains ‘invariable in its essence.’  Changing a fundamental law, would by default alter 
at least part of the overall jurisprudential framework, especially if the changed law was a part of 
legal framework based on revelation, which unless directly abrogated by the source itself - in this 
case God - ought not to change.  
Maistre’s reductionism and misrepresentations about Catholicism parallel what many scholars 
and religious figures have said about movements like al Qaeda and ISIS; its followers do not really 
understand Islam and Islamic principles, and if they do, they are purposely distorting meanings 
for their own purposes. The widely accepted consensus within the Sunni discourse is that a group 
like ISIS cannot appoint a Caliph and then claim it as the representative of all Muslims.  
“They may have been entitled to declare an “Islamic emirate” (as the Taliban did in Afghanistan) 
or even an “Islamic state,” just as Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mauritania are ‘“Islamic 
republics.” But to declare a caliphate for all Muslims when they rule over, at best, a few tens 
of millions Syrians and Iraqis out of a worldwide Muslim population of 1.2–1.5 billion, is to 
destroy any notion of Muslim representation or unity.” (Lister, 2015:22-23)
Like Maistre, ISIS seems to be making up their own rules that go against the generally accepted 
doctrines of their respective religious systems.  
Similar to Maistre’s worldview, at the heart of the al Qaeda and ISIS ideological narrative 
is a Manichean struggle between good and evil-one is either with their movement or against 
it.  In 1927, Carl Schmitt wrote that us-versus-them language, also known as the friend-enemy 
distinction, is at the heart of politics in general. (Schmitt, 1996 and Oprisko, 2012)  States achieve 
unity by defining themselves as what they are not.  In Schmitt’s words, 
“The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as 
an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business 
transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature 
that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the 
extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” (Schmitt, 1996:26-27)  
Maistre, al Qaeda, and ISIS each apply Schmitt’s notion of the political to their own religious 
purviews.  In the initial issue of Dabiq, Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi declares to the world,
“O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, 
with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and 
hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews 
[sic], the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all 
being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews [sic].” (Issue 1:10)
ISIS’s Schmittian/Manichean approach to Judaism and Christianity stands in stark contrast with 
famous Qur’an quote that calls for toleration between people of the book. 
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“Lo! Those who believe (in that which is revealed unto thee, Muhammad), and those who are 
Jews, and Christians, and Sabaeans - whoever believeth in Allah and the Last Day and doeth 
right - surely their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither 
shall they grieve.” (Qur’an 2:62)  
In a later edition of Dabiq, Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, the one time leader of al Qaeda of Iraq who 
was killed in a by a Joint U.S. force on 7 June, 2006 was quoted as saying, 
“So we warn the tribes, that any tribe of party or assembly whose involvement and collaboration 
with the crusaders and their apostate agents are confirmed, then by He who sent Muhammad 
with the truth, we will target them just as we target the crusaders, and we will eradicate and 
distinguish them, for there are only two camps: the camp of truth and its followers, and the 
camp of falsehood and its factions.” (Issue 3:12)
Similar us-versus-them rhetoric can be seen in earlier al Qaeda statements as well.  Al Qaeda 
tried to make two point-blank statements within a period of 3 years in an effort to condemn the 
American people as a whole and to gain support.  In an al Qaeda statement that was released in 
December 1998, it was made clear that all American’s were the enemy of Islam. “Every American 
is an enemy - whether he fights us directly or pays his taxes” (Al Qaeda statement, quoted in 
Ibrahim (ed.), 2007:281).  Just a few months after the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda reiterated their earlier 
condemnation of not just the policies of the American government, but of the American people 
in general, by issuing a similar statement.  This time however, they employed a syllogistic type of 
reasoning to back their claims.
“The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government, they elect 
their president, their government manufactures arms and gives them to Israel and Israel uses 
them to massacre Palestinians.  The American Congress endorses all government measures, 
and this proves that all America is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims. 
All of America, because they elect the Congress.” (Al Qaeda statement, quoted in Ibrahim 
(ed.), 2007:282) 
At first glance, the second statement seems reasonable enough deduce. 
P1: Americans vote for their political leaders
P2: Americans pay taxes to their government that is run by the political leaders whom they 
voted for  
P3: That government then uses those taxes to build arms that are given to Israel 
P4: Israel then use that uses those weapons to wage war against the Palestinians 
C: Therefore, Americans are also responsible for waging war against Palestinians 
However when taking into consideration the complexities of tax distribution (Americans do not 
get to pick and choose precisely how their taxes are allocated) and foreign military aid, not to 
mention the fact that most working Americans are forced to pay taxes - whether they vote for 
Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi / Marmara University Journal of Political Science • Cilt 4, Sayı 1, Mart 2016, ss. 195-216
213
their political leaders or not - it becomes quite obvious that this kind reductionist reasoning does 
not make sense.  
Nonetheless, someone already hostile to US foreign policy and the United States in general is 
more likely to ignore this over simplification. These are the types of people groups like al Qaeda 
and ISIS target.  Four days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia’s Chief Mufti, Shaikh 
Abdulaziz Al-Ashaikh called upon the ulema and other religious leaders to teach young Muslims 
that these extremist groups are wrong and operate outside the fold of Islam. Al-Ashaikh declared 
that, “it is the duty of the Muslim ulema (religious scholars) to make facts clear in this respect, 
and to clarify that Islam never accepts such acts” (KSA Press Release, 2001:online). Maistre, ISIS 
and al Qaeda’s rhetoric and propaganda - while polished, point blank, and often even poetic - 
nonetheless, remains intellectually deficient.  
Conclusion
This paper showed that there are many similarities in the ideas and language used by Joseph 
de Maistre in the past and contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movements today. It is 
important to note however that Maistre was never specifically a ‘Christian fundamentalist.’  He 
actually believed that Catholic dogmas were an evolutive truth and that; in his opinion, the 
progressive character of the Catholic Church excluded any type of return to the ‘primitive times’ 
of Christianity. Ultimately, he believed fundamentalism was a Protestant, rather than Catholic 
mistake. Nonetheless his many of reactionary attitudes do share some undeniable similarities 
with fundamentalist discourses. 
Following in the vein of Roxanne Euben, this paper also supports the claim that more comparative 
transgenerational scholarship is necessary to show how ideas that may seem foreign to the 
West might actually not be as alien as one thinks.  Further research on fundamentalism can 
help synthesize the ideas of fringe movements that may not be violent yet, into a more coherent 
set of axioms and recognizable patterns.  Most importantly, as mentioned in the beginning of 
this article, such comparative transgenerational research can contribute to the creation of more 
effective long term policy strategies to deal with such movements that pose serious threats to the 
general public well-being.  
The similarities between Maistre’s writings in the 18th century and Al Qaeda/ISIS in the 20th and 
21st centuries transcend religious boundaries and time.  Mark Juergensmeyer’s in depth look at 
contemporary manifestations of religious violence, Terror in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of 
Religious Violence (University of California Press, 2000), discussed certain similarities that are 
present in all contemporary religious extremist movements.  
“What they have in common are three things. First, they have rejected the compromises with 
liberal values and secular institutions that were made by most mainstream religious leaders 
and organizations. Second, they refuse to observe the boundaries that secular society has 
Joseph J. KAMINSKI
214
imposed around religion keeping it private rather than allowing it to intrude into public spaces. 
And third, they have replaced what they regard as weak modern substitutes with the more 
vibrant and demanding forms of religion that they imagine to be a part of their tradition’s 
beginnings.” (Juergensmeyer, 2000:221)
Much of Maistre, al Qaeda, and ISIS’s views’ nicely fit into Juergensmeyer’s characterization 
religious extremism.  I do not agree with Isaiah Berlin’s conclusion that Maistre was a proto-
fascist.  “In Berlin’s reading, Maistre was “at one with German irrationalism and fideism” and 
even held the dubious honor of being an intellectual forefather of fascism” (McMahon, 2001:9). 
In reality, as earlier members of the Frankfurt school have argued, fascism is a uniquely modern 
phenomenon that can be directly attributed to the Enlightenment (Horkheimer, 2002).  Maistre 
was not a fascist because fascism places ontological primacy on the state as the sole source of 
authority.  According to Spektorowski, 
“Not only was de Maistre and Donoso Cortés’s authoritarianism non-fascist but it also 
attempted to create a theoretical barrier against fascism. Indeed, these writers advanced a 
model of legitimate authoritarianism designed to offer an alternative to liberal politics and to 
fascist amoral decisionism.” (Spektorowski, 2008:456) 
Maistre places ontological primacy on religion and views the state as the ideal vehicle to promote 
its discourse.  This is to suggest that that state is ultimately a puppet of Papal authority. 
In regards to the bond between the Papacy and the European monarchy, Maistre comments that 
the papacy “created European monarchy, that wonderful work of more than human workmanship, 
which we coldly admire, like the sun, because we behold it every day” (1975:213).  The monarchy 
was a creation of the papacy, therefore it was also subservient to it when it came to pressing moral 
and ethical issues of the time.  I believe that it is more reasonable to label Maistre as more of an 
absolutist theocrat rather than a proto-fascist.  I believe this can be applied to the worldviews of 
ISIS and al Qaeda as well-both movements offer an authoritarian model of politics, designed to 
be in opposition to liberalism and the amoral decisionism that is an inherent feature of fascism.
Maistre does directly mention Islam in his writings.  In his comments on the power of the French 
scepter and what it could have accomplished, he states, “It would have aggrandized Europe, 
vanquished Islamism, and extinguished schism; unfortunately, however, it was not able to keep its 
ground” (1975:xxviii).  It is ironic that Maistre’s own language and ideology are more in line with 
contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, rather than the more moderate interpretations of Islam 
that existed during his own lifetime; an Islamism that the French scepter could have vanquished 
if it just were ‘able to keep its ground’.
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